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The Marital Rape Exemption in
Pennsylvania: "With this Ring . ."
I. Introduction
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself
upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her hus-
band, which she cannot retract.'
Lord Matthew Hale
The common law rule that a husband who has forced inter-
course with his wife may not be prosecuted for "rape" had its genesis
in this pronouncement by Lord Matthew Hale. At the time of Lord
Hale's statement, no legal authority existed to support this rationale.2
1. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628, 629 (1847). This statement, made by the seven-
teenth century British jurist, is the most famous and most frequently cited rationale for adher-
ence to the common law rule that a husband may not be prosecuted for committing forced
intercourse upon his wife. See, e.g., People v. Damen, 28 In. 2d 464, 466, 193 N.E.2d 25, 27
(1963); People v. Pizzura, 211 Mich. 71, 73, 178 N.W. 235, 236 (1920); People v. Meli, 193
N.Y.S. 365, 366-67 (Sup. CL 1922); Frazier v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905);
Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 389 (1857); Regina v. Clarke, 33 Crim. App.
216, 217, 2 All E.R. 448, 449 (1949). But cf State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386
(L. Div. 1977), aq/'dper curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd 85
N.J. 183, 426 A.2d 38 (1981). The Smith courts launched an unprecedented attack upon the
principle that a husband cannot be guilty of the rape of his wife. Lord Hale's rationale was
criticized and its applicability to modern society questioned throughout the Smith opinions "In
the years since Hale's formulation of the rule, attitudes towards the permanency of marriage
have changed and divorce has become far easier to obtain. The rule, formulated under vastly
different conditions, need not prevail when those conditions have changed." Id at 201, 426
A.2d at 42.
Lord Hale couched this principle in terms of contract law. Under the contract approach,
consent to the marital right of intercourse is irrevocably given by the wife at the time of mar-
riage. This view, commonly referred to as the "implied consent theory" or the "contractual
consent doctrines" is based upon the proposition that the matrimonial relationship imposes an
obligation on the wife. In essence, the marital right of the husband exists, not by virtue of
consent given at the time of each act of intercourse, as in the case of unmarried persons, but by
virtue of the consent given by the wife at the time of the marriage. See generaly Coddington,
Rape of a Wife, 96 JUST. P. 199 (1932); Howard, Rape ofa Wife, 118 JUST. P. 99 (1954);
Neville, Rape in Earli English Law, 121 JUST. P. 223 (1957).
2. In his dissent in Regina v. Clarence, 22 Q.B.D. 23, 57 (1888), Judge Field stated:
[Tihe authority of Hale, C.J., on such a matter is undoubtedly as high as any can be,
but no other authority is cited by him for this proposition, and I should hesitate
before I adopt it. There may, I think, be many cases in which a wife may lawfully
refuse intercourse, and in which if the husband imposed it by violence, he might be
held guilty of a crime.
See also State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 200, 426 A.2d 38, 41 (1981), "Hale cited no authority for
this proposition and we have found none in earlier writers. Thus the marital exemption rule
expressly adopted by many of our sister states has its source in a bare, extra-judicial declara-
tion made some 300 years ago."
For a review of earlier English law revealing concepts purportedly similar to Lord Hale's,
In the United States, the marital consent doctrine as articulated pre-
viously still pervades the statutes of virtually every jurisdiction.'
The crime of rape is recognized as an act of violence that subjects the
victim to physical and emotional pain and degradation,4 but the
same act, if it occurs between spouses, is not recognized as an offense
in the majority of states.5 Paradoxically, although marriage is
viewed as an institution of vital interest to society and the state,6 an
entire class of women, simply by virtue of their marital status, are
denied legal protection against forced sexual intercourse. Currently,
Pennsylvania offers only minimal legal protection to a wife who is
forced by her husband to submit to sexual intercourse.7
The seventeenth century view that the marriage contract con-
tained an implied nonretractable consent to intercourse on the part
of the wife8 was rooted in the belief that a woman was the property
of her mate? This attitude reflected the proposition that upon mar-
riage women forfeited their right to exercise free will in their sexual
see Comment, The Marital Exception to Rape- Past, Present and Future [1978] DET. L. REV.
261, 263 n.15 [hereinafter cited as Marital Exception]. See also Part V,B. infra.
3. See Part III.A. infra
4. Judicial opinions recognizing the effects of rape on the victim commonly state that
"[tihe essence of the crime [of rape] is . . . not the fact of intercourse, but the injury and
outrage to the modesty and feelings of the woman, by means of the carnal knowledge effected
by force." State v. Castner, 122 Me. 106, 106, 119 A. 112, 112 (1921). See also State v. Romo,
66 Ariz. 174, 189, 185 P.2d 757, 767 (1947). More recently, the court in State v. Smith, 148 N.J.
Super. 219, 226, 372 A.2d 386, 390 (L. Div. 1977), aj7'd per cutam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404
A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981) stated: "Rape subjugates
and humiliates the woman, leaving her with little retaliatory capability .. "
Numerous studies of the psychological aftermath of rape have been completed. For ex-
ample, the Philadelphia Sexual Assault Victim Study, compiled by the Center for Rape Con-
cern in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, systematically explored the consequences of rape. The
survey included over 1400 women of all ages who reported a rape or sexual assault to authori-
ties in Philadelphia. Data analysis revealed particular adjustment problems in the following
areas: (1) increased fear of being alone on the street; (2) decreased social activities; (3) changed
eating and sleeping habits, including increased nightmares; (4) worsened relations with family,
husband or boyfriend, and (5) increased negative feelings toward known or unknown men.
See T. McCahill, L. Meyer & A. Fischman, THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE (1979). See also D.
Chapell, R. Geis & G. Geis, FORCIBLE RAPE: THE CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE OFFENDER
(1977).
5. See note 40 infta.
6. See State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L. Div. 1977), afdpercuriam,
169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981). "It
has always been recognized that 'marriage contracts cannot be placed on par with ordinary
contractual obligations' because, '[I]n every marriage contract, the State is an interested
party.'" 148 N.J. Super. at 228, 372 A.2d at 390 (quoting PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 3
(1951)). See also Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 12 N.E.2d 134 (1938), which described mar-
riage as "an institution involving the highest interest of society and is regulated and controlled
by law based upon principles of public policy affecting the welfare of the people of the State."
Id at 162, 12 N.E.2d at 138; Pisciotta v. Buccino, 22 N.J. Super. 114, 91 A.2d 629 (App. Div.
1952).
7. See note 12 and accompanying text infra
8. See note I and accompanying text supra.
9. As the trial court in State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 229, 372 A.2d 386, 391 (L.
Div. 1977), afl'dper curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J.
193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981), commented, "A close examination of the historical origins of [the
immunity of a husband for rape] reveal [sic] that it is rooted in the ancient concepts of a wife
as a chattel and the inviolability of the. husband's supreme role in a marriage relationship."
interactions. This proposition is clearly inconsistent with twentieth
century standards.' 0 Indeed, attitudes concerning women and mar-
riage have changed so drastically in the past centuries, most perva-
sively in the past decade, that no reasonable justification exists for
the continued exemption of a husband from criminal prosecution for
the rape of his wife.i"
Pennsylvania presently affords protection to a married woman
from intercourse forced by her husband only in two situations: (1) if
she is living in a residence separate from her husband, or (2) if she is
living in the same residence with her husband but under the terms of
a written separation agreement or court order.' 2  If a woman in
Pennsylvania is unable or unwilling to seek one of these arrange-
ments,' 3 however, her husband has "an unbridled right, protected by
law, to force himself sexually upon her at any time he chooses."' 4
This comment suggests consideration and rectification of the inade-
quate protection given to wives raped by their husbands. A discus-
sion of the historical rationale of the marital rape exemption is
See J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE: A GUIDE TO THE EMOTIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL,
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ABUSED WOMAN AND THOSE HELPING HER 3 (1979).
A related rationale underlying the immunity of the husband derives from the common
law "unity of person" principle. As Blackstone described: "By marriage the husband and wife
are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband
under whose wing, protection and cover, she performs every thing." I BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES 442 (1765). See also Comment, " "A Little Dearer Than His Horse"- Legal Ste-
reotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 259 (1971); G. BARKER-
BENFIELD, THE H-ORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN LIFE (1976).
10. See, e.g., L. KANTOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
(1969).
11. While such concepts [as viewing the wife as the chattel of the husband] standing
alone have long since disappeared, American courts in their mechanistic application
of this principle have failed- to come to grips with the changes that have occurred in
the status of a wife since the 17th century. In other areas modem jurisprudence has
consistently refused to permit such male dominated concepts to stand in the way of
equal protection of the laws.
State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 229, 372 A.2d 386, 391 (L. Div. 1977), a]dper curiam, 169
N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rey'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
12. 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981) provides:
Whenever in this chapter [sexual offenses] the definition of an offense excludes con-
duct with a spouse, the exclusion shall be deemed to extend to persons living as man
and wife, regardless of the legal status of their relationship: Provided, however, That
the exclusion shall be inoperative as respects spouses living in separate residences, or
in the same residence but under terms of a written separation agreement or an order
of a court of record. Where the definition of an offense excludes conduct with a
spouse, this shall not preclude conviction of a spouse as accomplice in a sexual act
which he or she causes another person, not within the exclusion, to perform.
Previously, spouses were required to live apart under a decree of judicial separation for the
exclusion to be inoperative.
13. Reasons that wives remain with husbands who rape them may include the lack of
financial means to leave; their fear of what their relatives, friends, and neighbors will think; or
their fear of a violent husband. Additionally, wives may remain because they are socially
conditioned to preserve their marriages at any cost. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976) at
72-86.
14. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 227, 372 A.2d 386, 390 (L. Div. 1977), ad per
curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38
(1981).
presented with an examination of the various statutory approaches
allowing for a spousal prosecution. Arguments are offered to sup-
port the abolition of the marital rape exemption, and the difficulties
of enforcement of a marital rape statute are analyzed. Several alter-
native legal protections are suggested in an attempt to present a via-
ble solution to the marital rape problem.
II. Historical Analysis
A. Common Law- Husband as Perpetrator
The notion that a husband who rapes his wife lacks criminal
liability first appeared in American jurisprudence as dictum in 1857
in Commonwealth v. Fogerty. ,5 The Massachusetts court announced
that it would always be a competent defense to show that the alleged
victim was actually the wife of the defendant.' 6 This grant of immu-
nity virtually precluded a married woman from filing charges against
her spouse for rape or assault with intent to rape.
Lord Hale's theory that upon marriage a wife automatically
consents to the husband's demand of his "marital right of inter-
course,"' 17 controlled even when a wife explicitly denied her consent
to cohabitation and sexual intercourse. Thus, in Frazier v. State, 18
the court steadfastly held that although the couple had separated, the
husband could not be guilty of forcing intercourse upon his wife.
One of the main reasons for this decision was "the matrimonial con-
sent which [the woman] gives when she assumes the marriage rela-
tion." 9 The Frazier decision later served as the basis for the reversal
of a husband's conviction for an assault with the intent to rape his
wife in Duckett v. State. 2 0 The Duckett court found no violation of
the law solely because the record indicated that the prosecutrix and
accused were man and wife at the time of the offense.
Only the right of the wife "to protect her health and her life
from the ungoverned lust of her husband"'" limited the husband's
15. 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 489 (1857).
16. Id at 491.
17. See note 1 and accompanying text supra Accord, 13 R.C.L. 988 (1916): "[I]n the
exercise of this marital right [the husband] cannot be guilty of the offense of rape." Cf. S.
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975). "[C]ompulsory sexual
intercourse is not a husband's right in marriage, for such a 'right' gives lie to any concept of
equality and human dignity." Id at 381 (emphasis added).
18. 48 Tex. Crim. 142, 86 S.W. 754 (1905). In this case, the couple was denied a divorce
for unspecified reasons. Thereafter, they continued to live in the same house, but did not share
the same bedroom.
19. Id at 143, 86 S.W. at 755. "[W]e are aware of no case holding that the husband can
be guilty of the offense where he himself is the actual party to the intercourse." Id See also
State v. Haines, 51 La. 731, 25 So. 372 (1899) (husband cannot be guilty as principal in rape of
wife).
20. 149 Tex. Crim. 100, 191 S.W.2d 879 (1946).
21. Hines v. Hines, 192 Iowa 569, 571, 185 N.W. 91, 92 (1921) (wife's divorce action
right to enforce a sexual connection.22 Such extreme action by the
husband was seen as a species of personal violence, unjustifiable
under the claim of lawful exercise of marital rights.23 Although con-
siderations of "health and decency"24 qualified the husband's rights,
the wife still had to establish that excessive sexual demands, result-
ing in actual physical illness, had occurred; only then would courts
afford the wife her single remedy - divorce.25
Following the award of a divorce decree, protection was af-
forded to the woman against sexual attack by her ex-mate.26 This
position, consistent with the consent doctrine, assumed that the
wife's consent to all sexual relations with her husband ceased when
the marriage was dissolved. Therefore, in State v. Parsons,27 the
alleged cruel and inhuman treatment and personal indignities from excessive demands for
sexual intercourse that impaired her health and endangered her life).
22. 13 R.C.L. 988 (1916). "[Tlhough technically her person is as sacred from his violence
as from that of any other person, it is his legal right to enforce sexual connection." Id at 1401.
23. Hines v. Hines, 192 Iowa 569, 570, 185 N.W. 91, 92 (1921). The Hines court declared:
[Tlhese [marital] rights are reciprocal, and exist on the part of the wife as distinctly as
on the part of the husband. It is true that marital rights involve marital duties, and
include the duty of forebearance on the part of the husband at the reasonable request
of the wife, as well as the duty of submission on the part of the wife at the reasonable
request of the husband. . . .To unduly emphasize either would be manifestly unjust.
Id
24. Anonomyous, 206 Ala. 295, 297, 89 So. 462, 464 (1921). The wife wished to abstain
from sexual intercourse to prevent the birth of more children because of the husband's
financial inability to properly care for them. Although the Alabama court recognized that the
"marital right" to sexual intercourse was not absolute, it rejected this reason for the wife's
refusal. The court held that "[clomplainant's summary denial of the right cannot upon the
ground averred, be excused, much less justified, and she was by her own admission guilty of a
grave breach of marital duty." Id
25. Divorces were frequently granted on the grounds of cruelty or indignities arising
from excessive sexual demands by the husband. Eg., Cimijotti v. Cimijotti, 255 Iowa 77, 81,
121 N.W.2d 537, 541 (1963) (evidence of the adverse effect of excessive sexual demands made
by defendant-husband on plaintiff-wife sufficient to uphold award of divorce); Griest v. Griest,
154 Md. 696, 140 A. 590 (1928) (husband's unreasonable insistence on marital rights during
menopause amounted to cruelty entitling wife to divorce); Diehl v. Dieh, 188 Pa. Super. Ct.
491,495, 149 A.2d 133, 135 (1959) ("[s]exual excess, although not endangering life, if it renders
the condition of the spouse intolerable and life burdensome, constitutes indignities to the per-
son").
Some courts have required a showing that the excessive demands resulted in injury to the
wife's physical health. See, e.g., Obennoskey v. Obennoskey, 215 Ark. 358, 361, 220 S.W.2d
610, 612 (1949); Mayhew v. Mayhew, 61 Conn. 233, 23 A. 966 (1891); Norvell v. Norvell, 194
S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). Other courts, however, have deemed it sufficient for
the wife to show resultant mental disturbance:
There are many courses of conduct other than outright physical violence which have
been held by this court to satisfy these requirements [for cruel and inhuman treat-
ment]. Any mistreatment which deprives the person of needed rest and peace of
mind and affects the nervous system and bodily functions to the extent that the health
is undermined, endangers the life as effectively as physical violence. These include
, , * excessive sexual demands.
Cimijotti v. Cimijotti, 255 Iowa 77, 79, 121 N.W.2d 537, 538 (1963) (citations omitted); Hines
v. Hines, 192 Iowa 569, 185 N.W. 91 (1921).
26. See Baugh v. State, 402 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Crim. 1966) (prosecutrix and defendant
were no longer husband and wife on evening of day prosectrix was granted divorce from de-
fendant so that defendant's acts of forcing prosecutrix to have intercourse with him against her
will on two occasions that evening constituted rape).
27. 285 S.W. 412 (Mo. 1926).
court refused to allow the previous marriage of the defendant to the
prosecuting witness to "excuse, mitigate or palliate the offense."28
Some courts still rule that a wife is "irrebutably presumed to
consent to sexual relations with her husband even if forcible and
without consent."29 The consent theory has been used to deny ali-
mony to a wife that refuses, while married, to engage in normal sex-
ual relations with her husband.30 The wife's actions, "without any
attempt to explain or justify the refusal, such as prior outrageous
behavior by the denied spouse, constitutes cruel treatment and out-
rage of such nature as to render living together insupportable."'"
B. Early Statutory Application. Husband as Perpetrator
During the middle and late nineteenth century, many states
codified the English common law and incorporated the spousal ex-
clusion into the statutory definition of rape. In those few states that
did not codify the spousal exemption, judicial interpretation incor-
porated the exception.32 Until recently, therefore, virtually all juris-
dictions defined rape as any "unlawful carnal knowledge of a female
not the wife of the defendant."33 In fact, many decisions under such
statutes held that an indictment was fatally defective if it failed to
allege that the complainant was not the wife of the accused.34
C. Husband as Aider andAbettor
While a husband was personally able to force sexual intercourse
upon his wife without incurring criminal liability, the common law
rule did not allow a husband to assist or compel another man to rape
his wife. Lord Hale believed that a wife gave her husband unbridled
access to her body, but he conceded that she was "not to be by him
prostituted to another. ' 35  The husband's presence during the act
made him an abettor to the crime and therefore indictable as a prin-
28. Id at 412.
29. State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134, 140, 560 P.2d 925, 931 (1977).
30. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 354 So. 2d 704 (La. 1978). "In this case Mrs. LeBlanc's failure
to deny her husband's statements about refusal of sex leaves that testimony uncontradicted.
She has thus failed to prove her entitlement to alimony." Id at 705.
31. Id at 705. But cf., Hinkle v. Hinkle, 209 Ga. 554, 556, 74 S.E.2d 657, 658 (1953)
(denial of sex must be for a continued period before court will grant divorce).
32. See note 141 and accompanying text infra
33. See note 40 and accompanying text infrat
34. Strict constructionist courts required that the indictment specifically aver that the
female was not the wife of the accused, see, e.g., People v. Miles, 9 Cal. App. 312, 101 P. 525
(1908); People v. Kingcannon, 276 Ill. 251, 114 N.E. 508 (1916); Duggins v. State, 76 Okla.
Crim. 168, 135 P.2d 347 (1943); Young v. Oklahoma, 8 Okla. 525, 58 P. 724 (1899); Dudley v.
State, 37 Tex. Crim. 543, 40 S.W. 505 (1897). Other courts, however, did not declare the in-
dictment insufficient for the failure to aver this status. See Curtis v. State, 89 Ark. 394, 117
S.W. 521 (1909); Commonwealth v. Landis, 129 Ky. 445, 112 S.W. 581 (1908); State v. Morri-
son, 46 Mont. 84, 125 P. 649 (1912).
35. 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROwN 628, 630 (1847).
cipal.36
Consequently, by judicial declaration and uniform statutory
definition, a husband could be prosecuted for the rape, or the assault
with the intent to rape, of his wife only by "procuring, aiding, abet-
ting or encouraging another to commit these offenses. ' 37 Originally,
the exoneration or acquittal of the actual perpetrator was a viable
defense for a husband charged as an accessory.38 As the distinction
between first and second degree principals dissolved, however, courts
tried and convicted husbands as aiders, regardless of the
prosecutorial status of the principal.39
III. Statutory Status of the Rule
A. State Statutes
The majority of states retain by statute the principle that a hus-
band is legally incapable of raping his wife.' A growing minority,
however, has recognized the social significance of this issue, and has
revised pertinent criminal statutes to allow prosecution of husbands
36. Id In the absence of collusion, however, the husband was found to be the "sole
perpetrator."
37. State v. Dowell, 106 N.C. 722, 724, 11 S.E. 525, 526 (1890). Accord, Elliott v. State,
190 Ga. 803, 10 S.E.2d 843 (1940); People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 28 N.W. 896 (1886);
Kitchen v. State, 101 Tex. Crim, 439, 276 S.W. 252 (1925).
38. See State v. Haines, 51 La. 731, 25 So. 372 (1899) (principal in second degree cannot
be found guilty unless principal in first degree is actually found to have perpetrated the act);
Myers v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. 129, 197 P. 884 (1921).
39. E.g., Cody v. State, 361 P.2d 307 (Okla. 1961), overruling Myers v. State, 19 Okla.
Crim. 129, 197 P. 884 (1921). See also Rozell v. State, 502 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. 1973) (actual
perpetrator acquitted, defendant convicted as a principal after he hit his wife and held her legs
during the act).
40. In the following jurisdictions, statutes specifically provide that rape is carnal knowl-
edge of a man against a woman not his wife: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (1978); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-65(2)(3) (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1(a)
(Smith-Hurd) (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1(b) (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN., § 21-3502(1)
(Supp. 1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(8) (Baldwin 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:41
(West Supp. 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 252(B) (Supp. 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 566.030 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-11 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-02(1) (Supp. 1979); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2907.05(A) (Baldwin 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-37-1 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (Supp. 1980); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
tit. 21, § 21.02(a) (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.040 (Supp. 1981); W. VA.
CODE § 61-8B-7(2) (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1980-81); Wyo. STAT.
§ 6-4-307 (1977).
The marital exemption from the definition of rape in other states is embodied in defini-
tional provisions specifying that a "female," for the purpose of the sexual offense statutes, is
"any female person who is not married to the actor." See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(4) (1975);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(4) (McKinney 1977).
In the following states, specific statutes exist which are entitled "Marital Exception":
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409(1) (1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107 (1977); MD. CRIM CODE ANN.
art. 27, § 464(D) (Supp. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(12) (Supp. 1981-82); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.373 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
27.8 (1979); S.C. CODE § 16-3-658 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3709 (Supp. 1980).
Thus, the common law rule is explicitly retained in 34 jurisdictions.
for raping their wives.4 1 Current statutes reflect a wide range of re-
quirements to be met before the marital rape exemption will be de-
nied.42
Explicit recognition of a married woman's right to bring charges
against her husband for forcible sexual intercourse exists in Califor-
nia,43 New Jersey, 44 and Oregon.45 Prosecution in these states is per-
mitted at any time during the marital relationship; no requirement
exists that formal steps be taken to dissolve the marriage. The Cali-
fornia Penal Code contains two forcible sexual intercourse provi-
sions, 46 one of which specifically addresses rape by a spouse.47 The
statute defines spousal rape as intercourse "accomplished against the
will of the spouse by means of force or fear of immediate and unlaw-
ful bodily injury. '48 A violation of this spousal rape provision must
be reported within thirty days of the occurrence to effect the arrest or
prosecution of the perpetrator.49 Punishment is set at either "impris-
onment in the county jail for not more than one year or in the state
prison for three, six, or eight years.
50
The New Jersey Legislature revised its Code of Criminal Justice
in 1979 to include spousal rape among the sexual assault provisions.
Aggravated sexual assault is a crime of the first degree and is com-
mitted when an actor engages in an act of sexual penetration using
"physical force or coercion and severe personal injury is sustained by
the victim."'" When sexual penetration occurs through the use of
physical force or coercion, but no severe personal injury results, sec-
ond degree sexual assault may be charged. 52 An explicit repeal of
41. The states which have to date amended their statutes include California, Iowa, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Oregon. See notes 43-45, 58, 59, 71 and accompanying text
infra.
42. These statutes require some degree of dissolution of the marriage to take place before
a husband may be prosecuted for the rape of his wife. Although some states end the marital
exemption when the parties are separated under a court order, others require the parties to live
apart under a separation agreement or order. See notes 57, 83 and and accompanying text
iqzfra.
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(a) (West Supp. 1981) reads: "Rape of a person who is the
spouse of a perpetrator is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished against the will of the
spouse by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the spouse of
another." This bill deleted the previous requirement that the spouse's resistance be overcome
by force or violence.
44. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West Supp. 1981): "No actor shall be presumed to be
incapable of committing a crime under this chapter because of. . .marriage to the victim."
45. ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.375 (1979). Rape in the first degree now reads, "(1) A person
who has sexual intercourse with a female commits the crime of rape in the first degree if. (a)
The female is subjected to forcible compulsion by the male." The spousal exception was re-
moved in 1977 when the definition of a female (any female not married to the actor) was
removed. See ORE. REV. STAT. §163.305 § 163.475 (1977).
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261-262 (West Supp. 1981).
47. See note 43 supra.
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(a) (West Supp. 1981).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(b) (West Supp. 1981).
50. CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West Supp. 1981).
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(a)(6) (West Supp. 1981).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(1) (West Supp. 1981).
the common law spousal exception states that no actor shall be pre-
sumed incapable of committing sexual offenses because of marriage
to the victim.
53
In Oregon, "a person who has sexual intercourse with a female
commits the crime of rape in the first degree if the female is sub-
jected to forcible compulsion by the male."54 The Oregon Legisla-
tive Assembly was the first to amend its crimes code to provide that
the marital relationship of the parties does not prevent prosecution
for any of the proscribed sexual offenses." This significant statutory
modification resulted in the widely publicized trial of John Rideout,
the first husband prosecuted for the rape of his wife during their co-
habitation. 6
Other states have retreated from an absolute exemption of hus-
bands, but a patchwork of provisions effectively maintains substan-
tial prosecutorial barriers for the rape victim who is married to her
assailant.57 Minnesota, 58 Iowa,59 and Nebraska,' however, have ap-
proached total abrogation of the marital rape exemption. The Min-
nesota enactments expressly delete the marital rape exception in
cases of sexual contact or penetration in the following circumstances:
(1) when the perpetrator uses force or coercion;6 ' (2) when such force
53. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-5(b) (West Supp. 1981). See note 44 supra.
54. ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.275(1)(a) (1979).
55. The Oregon statutes were revised in 1977. The revision of the California and New
Jersey provisions occurred in 1979).
56. State v. Rideout, [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2164.
57. The following states have a statutory marital exemption that is inapplicable, how-
ever, to married persons living in separate residences who have filed for divorce. IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-42-4-1(b) (Bums 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 25 1(A) (Supp. 1980); MD.
CRiM. LAW CODE ANN. art. 27, § 464D (Supp. 1980) (divorce decree required); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.788(12) (Supp. 1981-82); MO. STAT. ANN. § 566.010(2) (Vernon Supp. 1981); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 200.373(3) (1979). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(4) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1 (1979) (divorce decree required);
S.C. CODE § 16-3-658 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39.3709 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 940.225(6) (West Supp. 1980-81).
In other states, the marital exemption terminates when the parties are living apart,
whether or not a judicial separation decree is granted. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
409(2) (1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107(2) (1979) (180 day separation required); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (Supp. 1979).
In the following states there is no exemption when the parties are living apart or have
filed for legal separation or divorce: IDAHO CODE § 18-6107(1) (1979); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 45-5-506 (20 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:5 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-9-10(E) (1978); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
58. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341-609.351 (West Supp. 1981). "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to prohibit or restrain the prosecution for any other offense committed by
any person against his legal spouse." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West Supp. 1981). See
notes 61-65 and accompanying the infrz
59. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1-709.10 (West 1979). See notes 66-70 and accompanying
text infrz
60. NEa. REV. STAT. §§ 28-408.01 to 28-408.05 (1975). See note 71 and accompanying
text ,fra.
61. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.344(c) (West Supp. 1981) (penetration); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.345(c) (West Supp. 1981) (contact).
or coercion causes personal injury to the victim;62 (3) when the per-
petrator is armed with a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to
use the weapon to cause submission;63 and (4) when the circum-
stances of the attack cause the victim to reasonably fear imminent
serious bodily harm.' The marital defense, however, extends to
non-husband cohabitors and remains applicable when the victim is
mentally or physically disabled. The defense also extends to cases of
statutory rape.65
In Iowa, any sexual act between persons is deemed sexual abuse
when the act is performed by force or against the will of the other.
66
A husband, therefore, is subject to criminal prosecution if, in the
course of committing sexual abuse, he: (1) causes serious injury to
his spouse;67 (2) displays a deadly weapon in a threatening manner;
68
or (3) uses or threatens to use force which could result in death or
serious injury to any person.69 When, however, the sexual abuse oc-
curs by the plain use of force, or against the will of the other, the
husband is exempt from criminal prosecution. This immunity con-
tinues to exist because third degree sexual abuse can occur only "be-
tween persons who are not at the time cohabiting as husband and
wife."7 ° In essence, unless severe physical force or a weapon is used
or threatened to be used against the wife-victim, her husband-assail-
ant is not subject to criminal charges for sexual abuse.
The Nebraska Legislature amended its rape statutes to incorpo-
rate gender-neutral language.7' Whether the legislature intended to
abandon the spousal rape defense is an issue among commentators.72
Neither the courts nor the legislature have definitively decided this
question, but a strong presumption exists that spousal rape incidents
62. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342(e)(i) (West Supp. 1981) (penetration); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.343(e)(i) (West Supp. 1981) (contact).
63. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342(d) (West Supp. 1981) (penetration); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.343(d) (West Supp. 1981) (contact).
64. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342(c) (West Supp. 1981) (penetration); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.343(c) (West Supp. 1981) (contact).
65. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.349 (West Supp. 1981).
66. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1(1) (West 1979) states: "In any case where the consent or
acquiescence of the other is procured by threats of violence toward any person, the act is done
against the will of the other."
67. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.2 (West 1979).
68. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.3(1) (West 1979).
69. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.3(l) (West 1979).
70. IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1979).
71. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28.408.01.-28.408.05 (1975) ("any person who subjects another
person...").
72. Several commentators recognize that the Nebraska statutes are silent on the immu-
nity issue. See Marital Exception, supra note 2 at 265 n.24; Comment, The Marital Rape Ex-
emption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306, 318 n.77 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Marital Rape].
Other commentators, however, have concluded that Nebraska allows the prosecution of a
husband who rapes his wife. See, e.g., S. Barry, Spousal Rape." The Uncommon Law, 66
A.B.A. JOURNAL 1088, 1090 (Sept. 1980).
may be prosecuted.73 The absence of a separate provision, common
in other state statutes, that specifically limits or denies a husband's
liability, supports the assumption that the legislature intended to
protect married women from rape by their husbands.74 Similarly,
Hawaii deleted the marital rape exemption by incorporating gender-
neutral terms into its rape statute.75 Unlike Nebraska, however, Ha-
waii exempts "voluntary social companions" from criminal liability
for rape in the first degree,76 which arguably operates to except
spouses or cohabitants.77
The marital rape law in Delaware is particularly unclear. The
exemption has been removed from first and second degree rape of-
fenses, 78 but a female who was the "date" of the defendant and who
previously engaged in sexual contact with him is not protected from
subsequent nonconsensual intercourse. 79  Although judicially un-
tested, this exemption may serve to negate criminal liability for
spouses or cohabitants who are considered "voluntary social com-
panions" for purposes of the statute.
The remaining jurisdictions require varying degrees of dissolu-
tion of the marriage in order to charge a husband with the rape of his
wife.8 0 Some state classifications require the couple to live in sepa-
rate residences. Others require separate residences and filed divorce
or separation petitions.8 Several jurisdictions disallow the marital
73. This presumption is based on several factors. First, the intent of the legislature is
expounded in NEB. REV. STAT. § 28.408.01 (1975): "It is the intent of the Legislature to enact
laws dealing with sexual assault and related criminal sexual offenses which will protect the
dignity ofthe victim at all stages of judicial process." (emphasis added). Second, the victim is
described as "the person alleging to have been sexually molested." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
408.02(6) (1975). Third, the absence of a "not his spouse" clause, coupled with the absence of
a reference to marriage or spouses in the statute, allows a strong inference that a spousal prose-
cution for rape is available.
74. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409(2) (1978) (exception terminates where spouses
live apart whether or not under a decree of judicial separation). Cf. MD. CRIM. LAW ANN.
art. 27, § 464D (Supp. 1980) (parties must be living apart pursuant to divorce decree for hus-
band to be liable).
75. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 707-730 to 707-742 (1979).
76. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 709-730 (1979).
77. Arguably, spouses and cohabitants constitute voluntary social companions of the ac-
tor on the occasion in question, provided that the couple has not manifested an intention to
dissolve the relationship, for example, through the establishment of separate residences or the
institution of a separation agreement.
78. "A male is guilty of rape in the first degree when he intentionally engages in sexual
intercourse with a female without her consent, and: (1) in the course of the offense he inflicts
serious physical, mental or emotional injury upon the victim." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 764
"A male is guilty of rape in the second degree when he intentionally engages in sexual inter-
course with a female without her consent." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 764(2) (1979).
79. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 763 (1979) "Sexual contact" is defined as "any touching of
the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual
desire of either party." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773(d) (1979).
80. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445(a)(1) (1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-409(2)
(1978); IDAHO CODE § 18-6107(2) (1979) (180 day requirement); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (Supp. 1979).
81. See note 57 supr
exemption when the parties live apart or have initiated separation or
divorce proceedings.8 2 Other states required a court-ordered separa-
tion or supervised separation agreement before rape statutes are en-
forceable."3
Although the statutes of six states do not employ an express
marital exemption clause, 4 the intention to retain the common law
rule is presumed. 5 Explicit preclusion of the prosecution of a mate
for the rape of his wife exists in thirty-four states insofar as their
statutes limit possible victims to females other than the spouse of the
actor.8 6 Of the states retaining the marital exception, the majority
also except cohabitants.8 7 Additionally, voluntary social compan-
ions are immunized in several states.88
B. The Pennsylvania Statute
In Pennsylvania, a woman must be in a prescribed relationship
with her husband before she is afforded the protection of sexual as-
sault statutes. By virtue of a 1976 amendment, 9 a husband may
only be charged with the rape of his wife in two specific situations.
First, a husband who forces intercourse upon his wife when the
spouses are living in separate residences is not protected by the mari-
tal exclusion. 9° Second, when spouses remain in the same residence,
but are subject to either a written separation agreement or a court-
82. See note 57 supra.
83. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:31 (West Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-
10E (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A) (Baldwin 1979); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-307 (1977).
84. See ARK. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1804-41-1809 (1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011
(West 1976); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-2001.-26-2022 (Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
265, § 22 (West Supp. 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3.65 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 18.2-61
(1970).
85. Because of the prevalence of the common law rule and the deep entrenchment of the
rule in social mores, one can argue that the legislatures of these states did not intend to abolish
the common law exemption. See Annot., 84 A.L.R.2d 1017, 1019 (1962). But cf., 14 Nat'l
Clearing House Rev. 538 (No. 6, Oct. 1980) (issue remains a matter of judicial decision and
legislative intent).
86. See note 40 supra.
87. Cohabitants are excepted in: ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(4) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-3-409(10 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-67(b) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 772(b) (1979) (sexual assault); IowA CODE ANN. § 709.4 (West 1979) (3d degree
sexual abuse); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.010(3) (Baldwin 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 252.2 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 45-5-506 (1979); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 21.12 (Vernon 1974); W.
VA. CODE § 61-8B-1(2) (1977).
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 764(2) (first degree rape exemption if victim was defend-
ant's "voluntary social companion"); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-730(l)(a)(i) (1979) (exemption
to first degree rape if victim was defendant's "voluntary social companion" who had permitted
the defendant sexual intercourse within the previous twelve months); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, § 252.3 (Supp. 1980) (exemption reduces class A crime to class B crime); W. VA. CODE
§ 61-8B-3(a) (iii) (1977) (exemption to first degree sexual assault).
89. Act of May 18, 1976, P.L. 120, No. 53, § I (amending B.B. 12:5(a) 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3102 (Purdon 1973)) See note 12 supra.
90. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
imposed separation order, the marital exception is dissolved.9'
This current provision is more accommodating than the prior
law, which required that the spouses live apart under a judicial sepa-
ration decree.92 Even under the amendment, however, protection re-
mains inadequate and unrealistic. Although no official statistics on
the subject of marital rape in Pennsylvania are available prior to
1977, 91 the year in which rape was defined as an act of sexual pene-
tration by a male upon a female not his wife, various estimates have
since been made of the incidence of marital rape.94 Research on vic-
tim-offender relationships dispels the myth that the majority of wo-
men are raped by strangers.95 Indeed, studies reveal that "the
91. Id
92. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon 1973) (amended 1976).
93. Forced marital sex is considerably underreported because it is either regarded as nor-
mal, or women are reluctant to admit that it happens to them. One research report indicates
that "such incidents seem to occur in both generally violent and violence-free relationships."
D. Finkelhov & K. Yllo, Forced Sex in Marriage. A Preliminary Research Report [Dept. of
Soc., Univ. of N.H. 1980] (on file in office of Dickinson Law Review). These researchers have
engaged in substantial sociological investigation on the phenomenon of marital rape. Their
research and analysis indicates that in many instances the offender's goal appears to be to
humiliate and retaliate against his wife. Id Results warranted a distinction in the types of
relationships in which sexual violence was found. First, women who were subject to a large
amount of physical and verbal abuse (minimal relation to sex), were subject to sexual violence
as another aspect of this general abuse. Id Analysis of the second group, whose members
encountered little physical violence, revealed that forced sex resulted from specifically sexual
conflicts (e.g., frequency of and appropriateness of sexual activities). In essence, "[alt some
point [the] disagreement spills over into violence. The man decides he is being denied and
frustrated and that he is going to get what he wants by force." Id at 17. See generally Com-
ment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wtfe, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as Rape and Battery].
94. The conventional wisdom concerning rape suggests that women are typically
assaulted in dark alleys by strangers. The research which has been carried out on
patterns of rape indicates that this conventional wisdom may be more myth than
reality. Amir's research (1971) on patterns of victimization revealed that 48% of the
rape victims knew the offender. Pauline Bart's (1975) examination of 1,070 question-
naires filled out by victims of rape found that 5% of the women were raped by rela-
tives, .4% by husbands, 1% by lovers, and 3% by ex-lovers. Thus, a total of 8.4% of
the women were raped by men with whom they had intimate relations. Bart's survey
also found that 12% of rape victims were raped by dates and 22% were raped by
acquaintances. Less then half of the victims (4 1%) were raped by total strangers.
R. GELLES, FAMILY VIOLENCE 125 (1979).
In order to acquire direct information on marital rape, Gelles gathered data from two
investigations. The first, a survey of Rape-Crisis Centers, provided information on the number
of cases of marital rape encountered at these shelters. The agencies that provided information
reported that raped wives were likely to be fearful of future assaults. The second investigation
was a segment of a larger study of physical violence between husbands and wives. These
interviews revealed that husbands appeared to believe that their wives should have intercourse
with them on demand. Moreover, husbands viewed a refusal of intercourse as grounds for
beating or intimidating their wives. Id at 131.
95. See Gelles, supra note 94, at 125. Additional research on rape reveals a pattern that
victims were likely to know the offender or to be related to the offender. Of the 250 rape
victims studied by the Center for Rape Concern at Philadelphia General Hospital (PGH), 58%
of the victims under the age of 18 were assaulted by a relative or acquaintance. See T. MCCA-
HILL, L. MEYER, & A. FISHMAN, THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE 9 (1979).
Direct evidence of the prevalence of marital rape in the population at large was gathered
in a 1978 study completed in San Francisco. See D. Russell, THE PREVALENCE AND IMPACT
OF MARITAL RAPE IN SAN FRANCISCO (Dept. of Soc., Mills College 1980) (paper presented at
Am. Soc. Assoc. meeting) (on file in office of Dickinson Law Review). Seventy-eight women
women who are raped by boyfriends, dates, husbands, relatives and
other men that they know might represent the tip of an iceberg which
reveals a more extensive pattern relating intimacy with forced sexual
relations."96
Judicial interpretations of the present rape and rape-related
statutes in Pennsylvania illustrate the effect of poor legislative draft-
ing. According to the 1963 and 1966 statutes, "whoever [had] unlaw-
ful carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and against her will" was
guilty of rape.97 The general definition of "whoever"specified any
person or individual.98 Because the courts presumed to follow the
common law rule, the complainant's husband was not included in
the "whoever" classification. The propriety of this interpretation of
the statute was implied from the use of the adjective "unlawful" in
proscribing the sexual behavior.99
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Common-
wealth v. Walker, "O misinterpreted the legislative intent to afford
protection to rape victims. In Walker, the court declared that "the
legislative scheme [was] to protect all females from invasions of the
person. . . [and] to protect all females from force and where force is
used, the actor is guilty of rape."' 0' It was an impossibility, however,
for all females to be protected because women married to their as-
sailants received no protection under the pure common law rule fol-
lowed at the time of the Walker case.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 02 enacted in 1973, uses more
in the sample of 930 experienced rape or attempted rape by a husband or ex-husband at least
one time. Id at 2.
This research also compiled statistics of multiple spousal rapes. Of the 71 women report-
ing multiple rapes by their husbands, 29% reported being raped once, 13% were reportedly
raped from 2-5 times, 13% from 6-10 times, 13% from 11-20 times, and 34% 20 times or more.
Id at 3.
A different type of study was performed in 1979 in an effort to reconcile representative-
ness problems created by agency-based samples. See J. Doron, CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN
INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS: Focus ON MAPrrAL RAPE (Barnard College 1980) (paper
presented at Am. Soc. Assoc. meeting) (on file in office of Dickinson Law Review).
For additional discussion of rape in marriage, see H. FEILD & L. BIENEN, JURORS AND
RAPE 163-66 (1980); D. RUSSELL, THE POLITICS OF RAPE 117-29 (1975).
96. GELLES, supra note 94, at 126.
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4721 (Purdon 1963). Upon revision in 1966, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4721(a) provided:
Whoever has unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and against her will, is
guilty of rape, a felony,, and on conviction, shall be sentenced to pay a fine not ex-
ceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), and undergo imprisonment. .. not less than
fifteen (15) years or more than life if in the course of the commission of the act, he
inflicts serious bodily injury upon anyone.
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4103 (Purdon 1966).
99. See Comment, Revision of the Law of Sex Crimes in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, 78
DICK. L. REV. 73, 74 (1974).
100. 468 Pa. 323, 362 A.2d 227 (1976). The defendant was convicted of forcible and statu-
tory rape. At the time the offenses were committed, the applicable statute was PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4721(a)(b) (Purdon 1966). See note 97 supra
101. 468 Pa. at 334, 362 A.2d at 232 (emphasis added).
102. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (Purdon 1973). "The Pennsylvania Crimes Code
explicit terminology in its definitions and clarifies the protection af-
forded by the rape statute. A rape does not occur unless the victim is
a person not the spouse of the actor.' The definition of spouse is
broad and includes a female cohabitating with a male, regardless of
the legal status of the relationship. 04
C Federal Proposals
L American Law Institute - Model Penal Code. -The 1962
Model Penal Code °5 (MPC) retains the traditional limitation of
rape to instances of male aggression against a female who is not his
wife. 0 The marital privilege is not removed until a divorce judg-
ment or judicial separation decree is obtained by spouses living in
separate residences.107 The exclusion is extended to unmarried per-
sons living together as if man and wife.' 08
Under the MPC approach, a husband who rapes his wife while
she is unconscious incurs no criminal liability. 0 9 Additionally, a
husband who forces sexual intercourse upon his wife after giving her
drugs or intoxicants without her knowledge and substantially im-
pairing her ability to appraise or control her conduct, cannot be
charged with rape. 10 Furthermore, a husband who has forced sex-
ual intercourse with his wife by using threats of imminent death, se-
rious bodily harm, or extreme pain cannot be prosecuted for rape."'l
These acts, if perpetrated upon any female other than the wife of the
actor, are classified as second degree felonies under the MPC. 12 In
contrast, a first degree felony rape occurs when the victim is not the
"date" of the actor on the occasion of the crime and has not previ-
presents an amalgam of prior law (judicial and statutory), the Model Penal Code, and the
P.B.A. Proposed Code." Comment, Revision of the Law of Crimes in Pennsylvania and New
Jersey, 78 DICK. L. REV. 73, 77 (1974). "The Crimes Code provides that rape is not committed
unless the victim is 'a person not the spouse of the actor,' thus clarifying the ambiguity in the
old law." Id
103. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3121 (Purdon 1973).
104. Id at § 3103 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
105. MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft, 1980). The Model Penal Code, promulgated by
the American Law Institute, has stimulated the widespread revision and codification of the
substantive criminal law in the United States. Thirty-four state codifications or revisions have
drawn upon the Model and revisions are proposed in ten other states. Courts look to the
Model Code as a persuasive statement of the principles and rules by which decisions should be
guided in construing provisions of the new codes as well as in areas governed by unwritten
law.
106. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(l)(a)-(d) (1980).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (1980). An informal separation arrangement made
between legally married persons living apart is insufficient to render the exclusion inapplica-
ble.
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(2) (1980).
109. Id at §213.1(1)(c)(1980).
110. Id. at § 213.1(1)b) (1980).
111. Id at § 213.2(l)(a) (1980).
112. Id at § 213.1 (1) (a)-(c) (1980).
ously permitted him sexual liberties. 113 If a "woman of ordinary res-
olution" could not resist the threats used by the rapist who compels
her to submit, then a "gross sexual imposition" has been commit-
ted.1 14 These arguably anachronistic provisions remain unchanged
since the drafting of the MPC.
The MPC's commentary on the retention of the
spousal/cohabitant exclusion is contradictory." 15 Comments to the
rape provisions acknowledge that the traditional rationale for a hus-
band's legal incapacity to rape his own wife - that marriage consti-
tutes a blanket consent to sexual intimacy revocable only upon
dissolution of the marital relationship - is essentially fictive.
"[T]here is no reason why agreement to enter into a relationship of
intimacy necessarily means consent to intercourse on demand.""' 6
Moreover, the American Law Institute (ALI), which drafted the
MPC, professes to advocate "a fresh look at the advisability of the
spousal exclusion."' 1 7 The comments to the MPC admit that a wo-
man may marry without surrendering to intercourse on demand and
if on occasion she refuses, the husband has no right to force her sub-
mission."' The ALI, however, declines to endorse spousal liability
for rape"I9 and is content with a husband's prosecution for assault.'
20
The ALI declares that the harm inflicted by a husband when he
forcibly rapes his wife is "qualitatively different" from the harm in-
flicted upon the victim by a stranger.' 2 1 In essence, the Institute be-
lieves that only stranger-rapists warrant prosecution for their acts. A
Comment provides:
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(ii) (1980).
"Rape is a felony of the second degree unless ... (ii) the victim was not a voluntary
social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted
him sexual liberties, in which case the offense is a felony of the first degree." Id (emphasis
added).
114. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2)(a) (1980).
115. Many of the commentaries to the Model Penal Code date from the mid-1950's and
express attitudes that are inaccurate and inconsistent with modem social mores.
116. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment 8(c) (1980).
117. Id
118. Id Accord, State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L. Div. 1977), aft'dper
curiam, 168 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38
(1981).
119. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment 8(c) (1980), provides in part: "Finally, there
is the case of intercourse coerced by force or threat of physical harm. Here the law already
authorizes a penalty for assault."
120. Id
121. Although the Model Penal Code does not equate the harm imposed by "stranger"
rape with the harm resultant from "spousal" rape, other commentators do not agree. See, e.g.,
Doron, supra note 95, at 7. "Marital rape is an extreme, severe and painful form of violence
between husband and wife. As one former victim commented, 'Being beaten, especially by
someone you love, is the most degrading and humiliating experience a woman can have.'.
Marital rape appears to be one of the most upsetting kinds of rape experiences for women. As
may be seen ... 65% of the women who were raped by a relative other than a husband...
and 61% of women raped by a stranger report being extremely upset as compared with 59% of
women raped by a husband, 42% of women raped by an acquaintance. Russell, supra
note 95, at 8.
The gravity of the crime of forcible rape derives not merely from
its violent character but also from its achievement of a particularly
degrading kind of unwanted intimacy. Where the attacker stands
in an ongoing relation of sexual intimacy, that evil, as distinct
from the force used to compel submission, may well be thought
qualitatively different. The character of the voluntary association
of husband and wife, in other words, may be thought to affect the
nature of the harm involved in unwanted intercourse. That, in
any event, is the conclusion long endorsed by the law of rape and
carried forward in the Model Code provision.
122
The nationwide adoption of this MPC formulation is questiona-
ble in light of the epidemic of reported offenses 23 and the marked
increase in public concern.' 24 Many states, however, have enacted
either comprehensive criminal code revisions or piecemeal sexual of-
fense statutes based on the MPC draft. 25 Until the MPC incorpo-
rates contemporary standards for the marital relationship and its
partners, the majority of states cannot be expected to make substan-
tial changes.
2. Reform of the Existing Federal Rape Law. -The existing
federal rape provision is criticized by one commentator for being
"grossly obsolete and indiscriminate."' 126  In 1971, the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws made compre-
hensive recommendations for revision of the federal criminal
code. 12 7 The Commission defined rape in the traditional manner as
"sexual intercourse by a male with a female not his wife."' 2' The
legislative draft differentiated in terms of seriousness between rapes
perpetrated by a stranger and those committed when the victim was
a "voluntary companion of the actor [and had] previously permitted
him sexual liberties."'
' 29
The Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979, 3o recently introduced
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment 8(c) (1980).
123. See note 94 supra
124. "The increased attention on the plight of victims of sexual assaults led to the estab-
lishment of Rape-Crisis Centers throughout the nation which provide legal, medical, and so-
cial services to victims of rape." GELLES, supra note 94, at 127. see generally W. Goode, Force
and Violence in the Family, - J. MARR AND FAM. 31 (1971); W. O'Donnell, Consensual Marital
Sodomy and Marital Rape - The Role ofthe Law and the Role of the Victim (Dept. of Criminal
Justice, Univ. of Cinn. 1980) (on file in office of Dickinson Law Review).
125. See note 105 supra
126. Stein, Comment on Rape, Involuntary Sodomy, Sexual Abuse and Related Offenses,
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: 2 Working Papers 867
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Working Papers]. The author offers legislative history and analysis
of the present federal rape law. See 18 U.S.C. § 2031 (1976), which provides: "Whoever
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, commits rape shall
suffer death, or imprisonment for any term of years or for life."
127. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: Study Draft
(1970) (hereinafter cited as Study Draft).
128. Study Draft, supra note 127, § 1641(1).
129. Study Draft, supra note 127, § 1641(2).
130. Proposed Amendments to Title 18 of United States Code: Hearing on S.1722, S.1723
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The proposed bill was intro-
in the Senate, proposed to codify, revise, and reform the present
Federal Criminal Code. The new provision would allow the wife to
file a rape charge naming her husband as a principal. 3 t To be ac-
tionable, however, the offense that is alleged must contain some evi-
dence of violence. The proposal prescribes that a person is guilty of
rape if he engages in a sexual act with another by compelling that
person to participate through the use of force, or by causing the other
person to fear that death or serious bodily injury is imminent.
132
If the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 is passed, its rape
provision may serve as an impetus to states that have not amended
their statutes to permit all women to prosecute for rape regardless of
their relationship with the assailant. 133 If the federal act is defeated,
the denial of the wife's ability to bring a sexual assault prosecution
may retard any advancement by state legislatures.
IV. Recent Developments
A. Attack on Common Law Rationales
The most important recent treatment of marital rape is the New
Jersey Superior and Supreme Court decisions in State v. Smith. "I
Although the lower court upheld the common-law rule, it also
launched an unprecedented attack upon the principle justifying its
holding. Indeed, the lower Smith court was the first to question the
permanency of a wife's continuous consent to sexual intercourse with
duced by Senators Kennedy, Thurmond, DeConcini, Hatch, and Simpson on September 7,
1979.
131. The marital exemption was excised in 1977 from a previous bill at the urging of
feminist groups. Senator Birch Bayh circulated a memorandum proposing the change among
Judiciary Committee members. When it was evident that the move would have overwhelming
support in the Committee, amendment was made to the bill without debate.
132. S.1722, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (1979) (emphasis added).
133. See Comment, ". . . For She Has No Right or Power to Refuse Her Consent,"
[1979] CRIM. L. REV. 558.
134. 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L. Div. 1977), afdper curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98,
404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rer'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981). In 1975, the defendant
was charged with rape, attrocious assault and battery, private lewdness, and impairing the
morals of a minor. Both courts, however, focused on the issue of whether a husband could be
guilty of raping his wife. The lower court maintained that the husband should be held crimi-
nally liable for rape, but it dismissed all charges against him even though the other issues
could have been tried. See also Exparte Kantrowitz, 24 Cal. App. 203, 140 P. 1078 (1914);
Smith & Hogan, Criminal Law 288 (3d ed. 1973).
In a companion case, State v. Morrison, 85 N.J. 212, 426 A.2d 47 (1981), the state supreme
court also held that the defendant was properly convicted of raping his estranged wife. The
court based its decision on the finding that "the purported common-law marital exemption
from rape would not exempt defendant under the circumstances." Id at 212, 426 A.2d at 48.
The Morrison facts reveal: (1) that the defendant and his wife had separated more than six
months before the alleged crime; (2) that the wife had filed a complaint for divorce; (3) that the
wife had obtained a temporary restraining order to keep defendant from "harassing, threaten-
ing or harming" her, and (4) that the defendant had executed an agreement not to molest his
estranged wife. Id "The presence of [these] additional circumstances. . . offer[ed] even more
compelling reasons that (sic) those in Smith for holding that defendant could be convicted of
raping his wife." Id at 213, 426 A.2d at 48.
her husband upon marriage. It attacked the most prevalent and en-
during rationale for the marital rape exemption, declared that the
application of contract law to the area of forcible sexual acts was
illogical, 135 and defended the right of married women to govern sex-
ual access to their bodies.1
36
To continue to perpetuate such approval leads to insiduous depri-
vation of sexual privacy to a victimized married woman. Policy
consideration labels should not be permitted to thwart justice.
Rather, having recognized that all women are entitled to this
uniquely female right of privacy, policy considerations should
propel us to insist that such lawless invasions not be condoned
under the guise of nice applications of contract law.'
37
The applicable statute in Smith did not specifically exclude a
wife-rape victim from its proscription; 38 therefore, the issue ad-
dressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court was whether a husband
could be charged with and convicted of raping his wife under the
former statute. Because the language of the statute did not reveal a
spousal exemption, the court's inquiry went beyond the "plain
meaning" of the statute. '39 The court determined that "the common
law did not include an absolute marital exemption from prosecution
for rape under all conditions."'" Although the lower court felt pow-
erless to disturb the common law or usurp the function of the legisla-
ture, 141 the state supreme court concluded that New Jersey "did not
135. [Jjurisdictions which have refused to allow such prosecutions have uniformly
and summarily rationalized that a husband cannot be guilty of rape because the wife,
upon entering into marriage, has irrevocably given her consent to sexual communica-
tion. They 'reason,' as did Hale, that the element of lack of consent has not been
satisfied. (citations omitted). It would appear that this superficial reasoning has been
perpetuated without serious challenge and without consideration of the fact that such
a mechanical application of principles of contract law are illogically applied in the
area of forcible sexual invasions.
148 N.J. Super. at 226-27, 372 A.2d at 390. See note I and accompanying text supra.
136. The court noted that "the issue should not be decided on the basis of the consent
doctrine." 148 N.J. Super. at 228, 372 A.2d at 391. See also Howard, supra note 1.
137. 148 N.J. Super. at 228, 372 A.2d at 390. See note 147 and accompanying text infra.
138. The pertinent statute provided: Any person who has carnal knowledge of a woman
forcibly against her will. . . is guilty of a high misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of
not more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 30 years or both. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:138-1 (West 1969). (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West Supp. 1981)).
Although the holding of the lower court in Smith was criticized because of its strict adherence
to the status quo, the compelling language used by the court motivated legislative change. In
1979, New Jersey revised its Code of Criminal Justice. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 14-5(b) (West
Supp. 1981) clearly illustrates the legislative determination that a spouse should not be ex-
cluded from punishment or enjoy any preferential treatment in matters such as marital rape.
See note 44 supra
In addition, the scope of the current statute is more expansive. "Under [N.J. STAT. ANN.]
§ 2C: 14-5(b) married men or women, whether living with or separately from their spouses, will
not be able to force their sexual wills upon their spouses without incurring the severe penalties
attached to our laws proscribing sexual assault." State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 210, 426 A.2d 38,
47 (1981), rev'g 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L. Div. 1977) (emphasis added).
139. 85 N.J. 193, 198, 426 A.2d 38, 40-1 (1981).
140. Id at 203, 426 A.2d at 43.
141. "[I]t is more properly a legislative, rather than a judicial function, to determine or
redetermine the type of conduct which will constitute the substantive crime of rape." 148 N.J.
Super. at 233, 372 A.2d at 393.
have a marital exemption rule for rape in 1975 that would have ap-
plied to this defendant and prevented his indictment and conviction
on the charge of raping his wife."'
' 42
In reaching its decision, the state supreme court declared invia-
ble the three major common law justifications for the marital exemp-
tion. First, the court announced that "the notion that a woman was
the property of her husband or father, . . . was never valid in this
country." 143 Second, the principle of "marital unity"'" was deemed
discarded in New Jersey by statutes enacted and cases decided prior
to the husband's commission of the alleged crime,' 45 and therefore
was eliminated as a basis for the marital exemption.
The implied consent rationale, the third and most prevalent jus-
tification, was found to be "offensive to [the court's] valued ideals of
personal liberty."' 146 Consequently, the court declared the implied
consent rationale unsound:
If a wife can exercise a legal right to separate from her husband
and eventually terminate the marriage "contract," may she not
also revoke a "term" of that contract, namely, consent to inter-
course? Just as a husband has no right to imprison his wife be-
cause of her marriage vow to him .. .he has no right to force
sexual relations upon her against her will.
147
Furthermore, the demise of the common law justifications and
the "plain meaning" of the statute gave the defendant sufficient no-
tice that his conduct would no longer be tolerated. Because "[tihe
personal liberty of women and the recognition of them as independ-
ent citizens under the law had developed beyond question through
legislative and judicial actions over more than a century,"' 148 no per-
son in New Jersey in 1975 "could justifiably claim that a man had a
legal right to impose his sexual will forcefully and violently on a
woman, even if it was his wife." 149 The Smith court decision should
serve as a model because of its refusal to mechanistically apply an
outdated rule. The implementation of statutory reform and a more
contemporary interpretation of statutes would likely begin if other
courts adopted as strong a position on the marital rape issue.
B. Prosecutorial Trend
The emerging trend among state prosecutors to actually pursue
criminal charges against men accused of raping their estranged wives
142. 85 N.J. 193, 207, 426 A.2d 38, 45 (1981), rev'k, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L.
Div. 1977).
143. Id at 204, 426 A.2d at 43-44.
144. See note 179 and accompanying text infra
145. 85 N.J. 193, 205, 426 A.2d 38, 44 (1981).
146. Id
147. Id at 205, 426 A.2d at 44.
148. Id at 210, 426 A.2d at 46.
149. Id at 210, 426 A.2d at 47.
is significant.' Traditionally, spousal rape suits were rarely prose-
cuted. Statutory impediments aside, the reluctance to initiate prose-
cutions may be attributed to the following: (1) the evidentiary
difficulty of proving the rape offense, particularly lack of consent;' 5'
(2) the dropping of charges by victims who fear censure from hus-
bands, relatives, and neighbors;' 52 and (3) the lack of social signifi-
cance assigned to the marital rape issue.'
53
Commonwealth v. Chretien '54 illustrates the trend toward crimi-
nal prosecution of husband-rapists. There, the state prosecuted
under a Massachusetts statute'55 that provided for criminal prosecu-
tion of whoever compelled a person to submit to sexual intercourse
by force or threat of bodily injury. In Chretien, the defendant-hus-
band was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for raping his
wife while the couple was living apart. This result may have been
influenced by the corroboration of the wife's complaint by the
couple's nine-year old son, which eliminated evidentiary problems
concerning the wife's revocation of consent to sexual intercourse.
5 6
Nevertheless, the decision in Chretien is a significant step in the pros-
ecution of marital rape incidents because previously the common
law was presumed to continue in Massachusetts in the absence of a
statutory spousal exemption. 57
The Chretien case indicates the presence of aggressive prosecu-
tors. The courts, however, have not been as aggressive in the vindi-
cation of the rights of wives. The defendant in People v. Kubasiak 58
was charged with felonious assault, breaking and entering with the
intent to commit felonious assault, and first degree criminal sexual
conduct against his wife.'5 9 Testimony revealed that to gain entry
150. The significance of this trend is that many prosecutors in the past openly expressed
their lack of sympathy for victims of marital rape. Prosecutors have often counseled victims to
drop rape charges against their spouse because of the difficulty of proving non-consent. See
Barry, supra note 72, at 1088-91.
151. See MaritalRape, supra note 72, at 313-15; Comment, MaritalRape in Calfornia: For
Better or For Worse, 8 SAN FERN. V. L. REV. 239, 250-51 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Rape in
California].
152. See Barry, supra note 72, at 1091.
153. See notes 93-96 supra.
154. [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2962 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1979).
155. "(a) Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a person,
and compels such person to submit by force and against his will or compel such person to
submit by threat of bodily injury. ... MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 22(a) (West Supp.
1981).
156. [1979] 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2962 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1979). The couple's nine-
year-old son testified at trial that he saw his father drag his mother into the bedroom of the
mother's home. For discussion of difficulty in establishing lack of consent of the victim of
marital rape, see discussion at Part VI.B. infra
157. See FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 95, at 304.
158. 98 Mich. App. 529, 296 N.W.2d 298 (1980).
159. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(2) (Supp. 1981) proscribes criminal sexual conduct in the
first degree. This section provides that
(1) [a] person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she
into the apartment of defendant's estranged wife, defendant and an-
other broke a window. The victim was then forced into the bedroom
by the defendant and sexually attacked.
The Kubasiak court admitted that the applicable statutory
spousal exclusion was reasonably subject to two or more interpreta-
tions.' 60 The court, however, strictly applied the statute. This pre-
cluded a finding of first degree criminal sexual conduct because
neither party had filed an action for divorce or separation. Although
the court recognized that the "[Michigan] Legislature intended that
the criminal sexual conduct act strengthen the criminal law describ-
ing unlawful sexual conduct,"' 6' it refused to recognize that the stat-
utory terms encompassed the defendant's act.
A better reasoned approach was propounded in the concurring
opinion, which urged the legislature to modify the statute and re-
move the divorce or separation filing requirement. The concurrence
recognized that many possible financial and social reasons 62 con-
tribute to a spouse's choice to separate on an informal basis and not
file for a divorce or a formal separation. The concurring judge did
not believe that these "spouses should be penalized for their choice,
one which may have been selected out of necessity."' 63  Although
this plea for relaxation of the statute may deserve credit, it also war-
rants criticism because it requires a wife to overtly renounce the mar-
engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following
circumstances exists:
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to
accomplish sexual penetration. Force or coercion includes but is not limited
to any of the following circumstances:
(i) When the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of
physical force or physical violence.
(ii) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or
violence on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the pres-
ent ability to execute these threats ...
In addition, the spousal exception provision states:
A person does not commit sexual assault under this act if the victim is his or her legal
spouse, unless the couple are living apart and one of them has filed for separate
maintenance or divorce.
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(12) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
160. People v. Kubasiak, 98 Mich. App. 529, 533, 296 N.W.2d 298, 300 (1980). Since the
defendant's wife was the alleged victim of the criminal sexual conduct, the defendant con-
tended that the marital relationship precluded a finding that first-degree criminal sexual con-
duct had been committed.
The defendant argued that interspousal immunity extended to all forms of criminal sexual
conduct and in particular to first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Id. at 533, 296 N.W.2d at
300. The state, on the other hand, argued that the statute's use of the term sexual "assault"
indicates that interspousal immunity extends only to those acts of criminal sexual conduct
which include an assault, that is, assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct. Id
See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.788(7) (Supp. 1981).
161. 98 Mich. App. at 535, 296 N.W.2d at 301 (1980).
162. The concurring opinion did not expatiate on these reasons. Other commentators,
however, have suggested that religious tenets and financial dependence may keep the woman
from formally separating or divorcing. See Finkelhor and Yllo, supra note 93, at 4. See gener-
ally BROWNMILLER, supra note 16; Martin, supra note 12.
163. 98 Mich. App. at 539, 296 N.W.2d at 303 (1980).
riage by divorce or separation in order to withdraw consent to sexual
intercourse. This requirement directly contradicts both the married
woman's right to sexual privacy espoused in Smith " and the princi-
ple of equality in marriage. 65 It also fails to acknowledge the harm
that flows from rape, even rape between spouses. 166
C Constitutional Attack
Prosecuted under Oregon's revised rape statute, State v.
Rideout167 attracted national attention as the first case in which a
husband was brought to trial for raping his wife while the two were
legally married and cohabitating. The constitutionality of the statute
was challenged by the defendant on the grounds that constitutional
guarantees of marital privacy and equal protection were violated.
The trial judge rejected this attack and upheld the statute in pre-trial
rulings. 1
6 8
Similarly, a constitutional challenge of state interference with
the private sexual behavior of adults was made in State v. Bate-
man. 169 In Bateman, statutes proscribing sodomy and lewd acts
were attacked as unconstitutional because they were applied to both
consenting and nonconsenting married couples. 70 The court of ap-
peals began its discussion of the constitutionality of the statute with
an analysis of Griswold v. Connecticut. 17' The court perceived in
Griswold the existence of a constitutionally protected right of privacy
in marital relations. This fundamental right of privacy'72 is fiercely
protected in the absence of a compelling state interest. Moreover,
any law attempting to regulate the sexual conduct of married persons
164. See notes 134-37 and accompanying text supra. Some form of rejection of the mar-
riage is required in the majority ofjurisdictions to prove the actual non-consent of the victim.
Under this view, a victim cannot be said to consent to sexual intercourse if she has (I) estab-
lished a residence separate from her husband, (2) filed for divorce, (3) filed for court-order of
separation, or (4) entered a voluntary formal separation agreement. Indeed, only these re-
quirements (or variations thereof) will trigger prosecution of a husband for the rape of his wife
in the majority of states. See note 42 supra
165. See Marital Rape, supra note 72 at 309.
166. See, e.g., M. Notman & C. Nadelson, The Rape Victim. Psychodynamic Considera-
tions, 133 AM. J. OF PsYcH. 408, 409 (1976).
167. [19791 5 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 2164.
168. Id
169. 25 Ariz. App. 1, 540 P.2d 732 (1975), af'dinpart, rev'din part 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d
6 (1976).
170. The defendant was charged with committing anal intercourse upon his wife and forc-
ing her to perform fellatio upon him. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the statutes defining these crimes were unconstitutional since they did not allow a defense
of consent. The trial court instructed the jury that consent is a defense to the pertinent statutes.
Verdicts of guilty were returned. Defendant then renewed his motion to dismiss, which was
granted by the court. The trial court found that the statutes in question would be unconstitu-
tional as applied to consenting married couples. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.
171. 381 U.S. 479 (1969). Griswold addressed the constitutionality of Connecticut statutes
criminalizing the use of contraceptives by married couples and criminalizing the activities of
those who aided and abetted in the use of these materials.
172. Id at 485.
must be shown to be "necessary ... to the accomplishment of a
permissible state policy."' 73 In its interpretation of Griswold, the
Bateman court expressly recognized that the state has the power to
constitutionally regulate forceful, nonconsenting sexual behavior be-
tween married couples.' 74
The Bateman court concluded that one of the fundamental
rights within the marriage relationship is consensual sexual activity,
which is protected from government regulation.'75 Therefore, the
court held that "[the state] cannot constitutionally criminalize con-
senting sexual behavior carried on by a married couple in pri-
vate."' 76 The significance of Bateman is its answer to the ultimate
question - is nonconsenting sexual activity between married persons
constitutionally protected? The court stated that although Arizona
had not criminalized forcible rape between husband and wife, this
did not mean that the state did not have the power to criminalize
such behavior. "[Tihe State does have a compelling state interest in
protecting its citizens from force and violence, even if that citizen
happens to be married to the perpetrator of the violence."' 77
The judicial recognition that wives should be protected from the
sexual violence of their husbands is an encouragement. Indeed, the
Arizona Supreme Court'78 agreed that the protection of citizens
from violence, "even if the combatants are married to one an-
other,"' 79 is a compelling state interest. The application of the Bate-
man rationale requires that marital rape be acknowledged as a
proper concern warranting state intervention and protection. Under
this constitutional approach, therefore, the marital rape exemption
should fall.
V. Abolition of the Marital Rape Exemption: Supporting
Arguments
A. Implied Consent Theory
The most common rationale supporting the spousal exception is
173. Id at 497.
174. 25 Ariz. App. at -, 540 P.2d at 734, 736 (1975). "[T]he right of privacy in the mar-
riage relationship does not create an all embracing fortress impregnable to the thrusts of state
regulation, but rather is descriptive of only certain types of marital conduct which is pro-
tected." Id at -, 540 P.2d at 734.
175. The Bateman court concluded that in the absence of a "compelling state interest"
consensual sexual activity is protected from governmental regulation as a fundamental right
inherent in the marriage relationship. Id at -, 540 P.2d at 736. If the state, however, is able to




178. 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d 6 (1976) (en banc), a7g in part, rev'g inpart, 25 Ariz. App. 1,
540 P.2d 732 (1975).
179. Id at 110, 547 P.2d at 9.
that upon marriage the wife irrevocably consents to the husband's
demand of the marital right to sexual intercourse. By contemporary
standards, however, the proposition that a marriage license consti-
tutes consent to all spousal sexual relations is a legal fiction. 8 °
Upon marriage, a person may indicate that he or she will usually
consent to sexual relations. It does not necessarily follow, however,
that upon marriage a person indicates willingness to engage in sex-
ual relations with his or her spouse.' 8 ' The consent doctrine, there-
fore, is a poor basis for determining whether a husband who forces
his wife to have sexual intercourse should be subject to criminal pen-
alty. Indeed, "in this more enlightened age there is no longer room
for such parochial thinking."
82
If the doctrine of implied consent is analyzed in other legal ar-
eas, its fallacious application to the marital rape issue becomes obvi-
ous. Therefore, if forcible sexual intercourse between spouses
cannot be rape because of implied consent, then neither can forced
sexual intercourse be a battery, since consent will likewise negate
that offense. 83 Just as a marriage certificate is not a license for the
spouse to commit assault and battery, it is not a license for the
spouse to rape. Consent to sexual intercourse should be granted mu-
tually by husband and wife, and if on occasion a wife refuses, "the
husband has no right to compel her to submit." 
84
B. Inequities Imposed on Married Women
At common law, the legal identity of a woman merged into her
husband's.'85 The wife's existence became completely incorporated
180. Comment, Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape, 43 CHI. L. REV. 613
(1976). This commentator recognizes that a strong policy reason for abolishing the consent
rationale is to protect freedom of choice:
The most dramatic example of the law's failure to place limits on the scope of
effective consent in rape cases is the legal fiction that marriage constitutes consent to
all marital sexual relations, no matter how brutal or unwelcome. Though this prac-
tice may be justified by judicial policy decisions to avoid the emotional issues and
proof problems involved in family disputes, or to encourage parties in an ongoing
relationship to resolve problems privately, the courts rarely articulate policy grounds
for decisions in this area. Were they to do so, they would be forced to recognize that
there are strong policy considerations behind the criminalization of rape which dis-
close the unfairness and danger of uncritical, universal application of this legal
fiction.
Id at 641 (footnotes omitted). See notes 136, 137 and accompanying text supra.
181. See State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L. Div. 1977), aft'dpercuriam,
169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981). See
also Rape and Battery, supra note 93, at 722-23, "It is unreasonable to infer that a wife intends
to make her body accessible to her husband whenever he wants her." Id
182. State v. Smith, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 101, 404 A.2d 331, 333 (App. Div. 1979), afl'gper
curiam, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L. Div. 1977), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38
(1981).
183. See Rape and Battery, supra note 93, at 722-23.
184. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1, Comment 8(c) (1980).
185. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAmES 430 (1765). Blackstone describes the relationship as
follows:
and consolidated; in essence, the wife became her husband's chattel.
Thus, a husband could not be charged with the criminal rape of his
wife; as his chattel, she could be used as any other piece of property.
The adoption of Married Women's Property Acts, which specifically
addressed the inequities imposed upon married women, abrogated
this discriminatory concept of wife as chattel. The property acts,
adopted in every American jurisdiction, provided married women
with the capacity to sue and be sued as if unmarried, to hold, man-
age, and convey property, and to make contracts.
86
The trend toward abrogation of the interspousal immunity de-
fense has proceeded steadily in the twentieth century, allowing a
wife to sue her husband for negligence, assault and other personal
torts.' 87  The marital privilege against adverse spousal testimony,
said to foster family harmony, has been abandoned if one spouse
commits an offense against the other or the property of the other.
1 88
Additionally, a husband and wife are no longer considered incapa-
ble of criminally conspiring with one another. 189 The abolition of
spousal immunity in the area of rape is congruent with these modem
developments.
C Protection from Other Domestic Crimes
The criminal law protects a spouse against gross bodily inva-
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorpo-
rated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protection and
cover, she performs every thing ....
Id
186. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-12 (West 1968).
187. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court abrogated the judicially created doctrine of inter-
spousal immunity in all tort actions in Hack v. Hack, No. 81-516 (Pa. Supreme Court, filed
July 14, 1981). The court concluded "that a tortfeasor's immunity from liability because of his
marital relationship with the injured party cannot be sustained on the basis of law, logic or
public policy." Id at 3. In addition, the court admitted "that interspousal immunity has sur-
vived as a doctrine in this Commonwealth only because this Court has erroneously interpreted
the statutes relating to married women. . . and adhered to outmoded common law concepts."
Id at 4. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1. (Purdon 1965). See also Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski,
321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663 (1936) (interspousal defense abolished in wrongful death actions).
188. Until recently, the general rule in federal courts held that one spouse could not be a
witness against the other in a criminal case on the policy grounds that such a privilege was
"necessary to foster family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and children, but
for the benefit of the public as well." Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958). In
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980), however the Supreme Court held that "apart
from confidential communications, a witness spouse alone has the privilege to refuse to testify
adversely; [and] the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testify-
ing." The rule is also subject to a well-established exception when one spouse commits an
offense against the other. See FED. R. EvID. §§ 502, 505; Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525
(1960). In United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975), the court announced that a
crime against a child of either spouse is a wrong against the other spouse rendering adverse
spousal testimony admissible. Id at 1366. Accord, United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752
(5th Cir. 1977). See also State v. Moxley, 6 Wash. App. 153, 491 P.2d 1326 (1972) (threat to
kill wife is not protected by marital privilege against disclosure).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960); Pegram v. United States, 361
F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1966).
sion. A husband may be found guilty of murder, manslaughter, and
abortion committed against his wife. 9 ° Logically, criminal sanctions
should also be imposed on a man for forcible intercourse with his
wife and for any injuries arising therefrom.
In the last decade, the advent of judicial intervention into the
marriage relationship directed the media's attention to spouse abuse.
It is recognized as a problem warranting increased legal and police
protection and public funding.' t Additionally, legislative enact-
ments provide an alternative for victims of domestic violence.
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Typically, however, these acts address only physical abuse or harass-
ment. Marital rape is accompanied by physical abuse in many in-
stances, but legislative endeavors ignore the sexual assault
component in marital rapes. The essence of the crime of rape, in
addition to the forced intercourse, is the injury and outrage to the
victim's emotions.' 93 It is therefore crucial that marital rape be af-
forded the legislative and judicial attention that it presently lacks.
D. Challenge to the Constitutionality of Rape Statutes
The constitutionality of rape and sexual offense statutes is most
often challenged on the ground that the different treatment of males
and females is a denial of equal protection. " In State v. Reilly, t95
the defendant attacked the New York rape statute 96 on the ground
that its singular reference to "males" treated rape as a purely mascu-
line crime by eliminating females from culpability. The court re-
jected this claim and found that the "physiological reality" that only
females may be raped provided a clearly rational basis for the legis-
lative limitation to males. 19' In the opinion of the court, "the protec-
tion of females from rape is a legitimate and essential legislative
objective."' 98 The classification was found to bear a "fair, reason-
190. For more detailed discussion on these areas, see Rape and Battery, supra note 93, at
720-22.
191. For an excellent examination of the phenomenon of abuse, see MARTIN, supra at
note 13.
192. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 238.1 (West Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 10181-10190 (Purdon Supp. 1981). See notes 223-26 and accompanying text infra.
193. See State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947); Commonwealth v. Goldenberg,
338 Mass. 377, 155 N.E.2d 187 (1958); Commonwealth v. McCan, 227 Mass. 199, 178 N.E. 633
(1931).
194. See State v. Griffin, 226 Ind. 279, 79 N.E.2d 537 (1948) (statute punishing only male
persons for visiting house of prostitution not unconstitutional); State v. Devall, 302 So. 2d 909
(La. 1974) (statute defining prostitution as a practice by a female not unconstitutional on the-
ory of violation of equal protection of the law); State v. Mertes, 60 Wis. 2d 414, 210 N.W.2d
741 (1973) (statute proscribing prostitution by females not unconstitutional).
195. 85 Misc. 2d 702, 381 N.Y.S.2d 732 (1976).
196. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 1975), proscribing rape in the first degree: "A
male is guilty of rape in the first degree when he engages in sexual intercourse with a female:
1. By forcible compulsion .. "(emphasis added),
197. 85 Misc. 2d at 706-07, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
198. Id at 707, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 738 (emphasis added). Furthermore, "[s]ince only males
can physiologically perpetrate that crime, then the limitation of culpability to males constitutes
able and substantial relationship to the object of the rape statute."1 99
Thus, all persons similarly situated were treated alike.
If the purpose of the statute is to guarantee the protection of
females from rape by males, then discrimination against the female
wife-victim is clear. In Reilly, the fact that only females may be
raped was regarded as a physiological reality.2" Because no physio-
logical difference exists between married and unmarried females, the
exclusion of married women from the protection of rape laws is a
denial of equal protection because it does not afford equal treatment
to all persons similarly situated.
Nor does the decision in Griswold v. Connecticut, 2 01 which found
that married couples have a privacy right to use contraceptives, pre-
clude the protection of wives from rape by their husbands. In Gris-
wold, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a
constitutionally protected right of "privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship."20 2 This protected right of privacy included the free-
dom from state invasion into consensual sexual behavior in mar-
riage. In contradistinction, marital rape constitutes nonconsensual
sexual conduct and arguably the Griswold limitation does not con-
trol.203
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,20 the Court declared that a Massachu-
setts law forbidding the distribution of contraceptives created dissim-
ilar treatment of married and unmarried persons. The statute
accorded different treatment to persons placed in distinct classes on
the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute.
The law, proscribing contraceptives for unmarried persons, violated
the equal protection clause because the court found that the right of
privacy encompassed "the decision whether to bear or beget a child"
and was "the right of the individual, married or single. ' 20 5 From a
judicial standpoint, a woman's individual bodily right to have or not
to have a child is analogous to a woman's individual bodily right to
have or refuse to have sexual intercourse. Eisenstadt held that mar-
ried and unmarried persons were similarly situated and were there-
fore both guaranteed the individual right to govern their bodily
integrity. It is therefore incongruous that married women are given
less protection than unmarried women on matters of individual pri-
a rational classification directly related to the objective of the criminal penalty." Id at 707-08,
381 N.Y.S.2d at 738.
199. Id at 708, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
200. See notes 191-92 and accompanying text supra
201. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See notes 167-170 and accompanying text supra
202. 381 U.S. at 486.
203. See notes 171-73 and accompanying text spra
204. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
205. Id at 453.
vacy that control sexual access to their bodies.2 °"
VI. Obstacles to the Enforcement of a Marital Rape Statute
A. Fear of Fabricated Accusations
The imposition of a marital rape law has been widely criti-
cized.2" 7 Legislators and legal commentators argue that the law
would result in an avalanche of fabricated accusations by wives.
These arguments presume that "scheming" wives will fabricate com-
plaints in order to punish their husbands or to blackmail them into
more favorable property settlements upon divorce.20°
Closely scrutinized, these arguments are without merit. The
fabrication rationale fails to recognize that rape prosecutions are
often more shameful and embarrassing for the victim than the de-
fendant. Because of "[tihe stigma associated with such a sordid inci-
dent, the reluctance to face the insinuations of defense attorneys, and
the fear of retaliation by the accused," rape is one of the most under-
reported crimes.2° These deterrents are certainly as powerful for the
wife-rape victim who, theoretically acting in revenge would surely
choose a tactic that is less humiliating and embarrassing for her-
self.2 10 Additionally, wives could equally choose prosecution for as-
sault or battery to pressure their husbands into favorable property
settlements upon divorce. This fear of inequitable leverage, how-
ever, should not suffice in Pennsylvania to deny the availability of
prosecution of a husband for rape. Currently in Pennsylvania, the
court will, upon request of either party, equitably divide the marital
property between the divorcing parties "without regard to marital
misconduct in such proportions as the court deems just after consid-
ering all relevant factors."22 '
206. For judicial recognition of this right to equal protection, see State v. Smith, 148 N.J.
Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (L. Div. 1977), aff'dper curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331
(App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
207. Writers have observed that there are "conceptual difficulties involved in making rape
a crime between husband and wife." Comment, Rape and Rape Laws.- Sexism in Society and
Law, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 919, 926 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rape Laws]. Another commenta-
tor argues that "[a]lthough wives need some form of protection by the criminal law from the
injurious consequences of forcible sexual intercourse with their husbands, rape is a category
ill-suited to marriage." Rape and Battery, supra note 93, at 725.
208. Rape Laws, supra note 201, at 935-36.
209. Marital Rape, supra note 72, at 315. See note 93 supra.
210. Although not a statistical sampling of the country, or even of Pittsburgh, our
control and Control Battered samples together should be a rough approximation of
the general population in Southwestern Pennsylvania. Looking at the percentages of
these combined control samples, only 3% of the women reported marital rape and
less than 10% reported other forms of violence.
I. Frieze, Causes and Consequences of Marital Rape (Univ. of Pittsburgh, 1980) (paper
presented at meeting of American Psychological Association) (on file in office of Dickinson
Law Review). This report appears to disprove the viability of the fear-of-fabricated-accusa-
tions rationale frequently enunciated in support of the retention of the marital exemption.
Study results show the reluctance of married women to report this crime. Id at 17-30.
211. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401(d) (Purdon Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the criminal justice system is designed to test the ve-
racity of all accusations. Every case brought in a court of law is
safeguarded by the imposition of the rules of civil and criminal pro-
cedure. Although rape by a spouse may be difficult to prove, juries
are no less competent to grapple with the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of evidence in a spousal-versus a nonspousal-rape case.
Indeed, in Smith, the court expressly rejected the supposition that
the criminal justice system would "completely and utterly fail to op-
erate" in marital rape circumstances.2" 2
The fear of prosecutions motivated by vengeance is unwar-
ranted since the law already allows a wife to bring charges against
her husband for numerous other offenses. As the court in Smith
noted, "[c]harges of assault, battery, larceny, fraud, and other of-
fenses may just as easily be the subject of such false accusations be-
tween spouses. 21 3 The chance that a spurious claim may be
asserted does not bar a conviction against a husband for any of these
offenses. Accordingly, a husband's prosecution for the rape of his
wife should not be impeded on this basis.
Moreover, the actual experience of other nations2'4 and states
that employ the enlightened approach to marital rape law verifies the
irrationality of this fear of false claims. Testimony reveals that "[t]he
oft-expressed fear that vindictive women will falsely report marital
rapes to gain leverage or power over their husbands has, most em-
phatically, not been Oregon's experience. 2 15 Nor has this occurred
in California, where approximately fifteen charges have been
brought in the two years since its marital rape statute became effec-
tive.2" 6 In addition, no onslaught of spurious marital rape com-
plaints has been reported in Sweden in the fifteen years since the
212. 148 N.J. Super. at 226, 372 A.2d at 389.
213. Id at 225-26, 372 A.2d at 389.
214. Several foreign jurisdictions allow prosecution of a husband for raping his wife.
Sweden, for example, altered its statute in 1965 to define rape in terms of a man forcing sexual
intercourse on a woman by the use of violence or threat of imminent danger. See PENAL
CODE OF SWEDEN ch. 6, § 1 (1965). The Danish Criminal Code similarly proscribes rape as
intercourse obtained by force. See also Geis, Rape-in-Marriage." Law and Law Reform in En-
gland, The United States and Sweden, 6 ADEL. L. REV. 284, 298 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Rape-in-Marriage].
The Communist Bloc countries of Russia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia view any violation
of sexual freedom as a violation of the right of self-determination, as an attack on the dignity
of man, and thus as an attack on the socialist system. In these nations, the law is applied to the
husband as it is applied to any other man. The Criminal Code of Yugoslavia, however, retains
the protection if the female is not in "matrimonial union" with the man. See Linveh, On Rape
and the Sanctity fMatrimony, 2 ISRAEL L. REV. 415, 420-21 (1967).
See generally English, The Husband Who Rapes His Wife, 126 NEW L.J. 1223 (1976).
215. Testimony of Peter F. Sandrock, Jr., District Attorney for Benton County Oregon,
before the California State Senate Judiciary Committee (August 21, 1979). See Rape in Cali-
fornia, supra note 145, at 250 n.75.
216. D. Finkelhor, Univ. of N.H., Dept. of Soc. (telephone interview conducted on Febru-
ary 2, 1980 with author). See also note 43 supra.
revision of its criminal code.2 17 The fear of spurious claims, there-
fore, is a questionable justification to continue the spousal immunity.
B. Difficulty of Proving Lack of Consent
A major obstacle to the enforcement of a marital rape statute is
the inherent difficulty of proving the wife's lack of consent. When
the accused is the husband of the victim, the problems of proof ap-
pear insurmountable because generally no witnesses exist.21 8 On this
basis, however, all rapes are difficult to prosecute and prove. In both
spousal and nonspousal incidents the dispute involves the victim's
credibility versus that of the accused. It is "his word against hers" in
other rape cases as well as in marital rape incidents. The lack of
witnesses is never a bar to the prosecution of a nonspousal rapist, nor
should it be when the assailant is married to his victim.
Visible signs of violence often appear in instances of forced sex-
ual intercourse between spouses; in such cases, problems of proof
should not impede the availability of a marital rape statute. Esti-
mates show that a significant number of residents in shelters for bat-
tered women "have experienced rape as part of the abuse."2 9 The
presence of bruises and contusions on the victim militates against the
conclusion that the intercourse was consensual. Evidentiary
problems also arise in spouse abuse situations but statutes have been
enacted in an attempt to protect women from the violence of their
husbands.220 Legislatures should follow this approach to the logical
conclusion that evidentiary problems do not justify the complete un-
availability of a spousal rape statute. Furthermore, the district attor-
ney, the judge, and the jury, acting in conjunction, are qualified to
review all of the evidence to determine the merits of a claim.
C. Interference with the Marital Relationship and the Possibility of
Reconciliation
The assertion has been made that intramarital rape prosecutions
would prevent reconciliation of marriage partners.22' It is incongru-
217. Rape-in-Marriage, supra note 208, at 302. Nevertheless the reform was deemed nec-
essary. "Our practical experience does not dictate any alteration in the reform measure. The
recommendation of the Sexual Offenses Commission is that sexual attacks in marriage and
marriage-like cohabitation should not be excluded from application of the criminal law." Id
at 298.
218. But see Commonwealth v. Chretien, [1979] 5 F.ms. L. REP. (BNA) 2962 (Mass. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 16, 1979) (son witnessed attack by father on mother). See note 150 and accompanying
text supra.
219. D. Baldwin, Director, Women in Crisis, Hummelstown, PA (telephone interview
with author on January 29, 1981). In addition, Ms. Baldwin reported that proof of nonconsent
is obvious in physical abuse cases - evidenced by bruises and injuries. See generally GELLES,
supra note 94, at 91-136; MARTIN, supra note 13, at 180-82.
220. Eg., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon Supp. 1981). California, Iowa,
and New York follow similar schemes.
221. See, e.g., Rape and Battery, supra note 93, at 725.
ous, however, to assert that a relationship traumatized by spousal
rape will be less reconcilable if the victim-spouse is denied the pro-
tection of the criminal law. Whenever a woman is forcibly sexually
assaulted by her husband, marital disharmony is already apparent
and will likely continue whether or not she is able to prosecute her
spouse for such behavior.222 Moreover, the cause of the marital dis-
cord is the perpetration of the spousal rape, not the possibility of
prosecution. The logical impediment to reconciliation, therefore, is
the occurrence of the forced intercourse, not the resulting prosecu-
tion.
When rape and domestic violence occur in a marriage, marital
conflict already exists. A criminal action is not likely to worsen such
situations. If this were the result, prosecution for other domestic
crimes would also be denied. Ironically, women and children now
enjoy greater administrative, legal, and judicial protection from
beatings by husbands and parents.223 Marital rape victims should
certainly be afforded the same right to bring a cause of action to
address their injury. The availability of reconciliation between
spouses who have experienced marital rape is equally as great with
and without such a statute.224 The statutes do not require that a wo-
man bring charges or testify against her husband;225 rather, the deci-
sion is optional. The crux of the matter is the option. Every married
woman should be able to independently decide whether the charge
would contribute to the destruction of the marriage. Prosecutions
for other domestic crimes are permitted without concern that the re-
sult may be an impediment to reconciliation. Denial of the ability to
prosecute for spousal rape on this basis is anomalous.
VII. Alternatives
A. Protection from Abuse Acts
Pursuant to the Protection from Abuse Act,226 an abused spouse
in Pennsylvania may institute a civil action, but not eliminate the
possibility of criminal sanctions, by filing a petition alleging abuse
by the defendant. Abuse is defined as the attempt to cause, or the
222. In his research, Finhelhor, supra at note 93, found that some interviewees submitted
to unwanted sexual intercourse because they have been forced in the past and realized it was
useless to resist. Additionally, wives reported that their husbands would simply beat them to
cause submission. Id at 4. These reports substantiate the continuity of marital disharmony in
the absence of prosecution.
223. See notes 189 & 214 and accompanying text supra
224. See, e.g., TIME, Jan. 8, 1979 at 61 (reporting reconciliation between John and Greta
Rideout less than two weeks after husband was found not guilty of raping his wife). See notes
163-64 and accompanying text supra.
225. Some statutes, however, impose deadlines for reporting marital rape. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 262(b) (West Supp. 1981) (no arrest or prosecution unless violation reported
within 30 days of the occurrence).
226. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
intentional and reckless causation of bodily injury, with or without a
deadly weapon.227 To receive a protection order, it is sufficient to
show that the spouse has been placed in fear of imminent serious
bodily harm by physical menace. 228 Family or household mem-
bers229 included in the Act are wives, husbands, unmarried couples
living together and separated couples.
Although the Protection from Abuse Act is an ostensibly viable
alternative for a marital rape victim, it has several critical weak-
nesses. Specifically, the Act does not address the forced sexual inter-
course action. The Act focuses on bodily injury, not the injury
sustained in rape, which differs in nature and seriousness. 23 ° The
suffering of abused wives is not to be minimized, but the marital
rape victim's injury, which often includes a physical component, is
more debasing. Sex crimes, especially rape, are a grave societal con-
cern because "the woman may suffer permanent emotional reprecus-
sions, and the psychological consequences for the victim are
impossible to calculate.
' 231
Rape has been described as the "supreme insult to feminine in-
tegrity;' '232 accordingly, punishment for this crime is universally
stringent.233 The meting of severe punishment evidences legislative
recognition of the inherently greater degree of injury suffered by the
individual and society when rape occurs.2 34 Indeed, "[r]ape subju-
gates and humiliates the woman, leaving her with little retaliatory
capability save that provided by law - to charge her attacker so that
a civilized society may lawfully exact a just penalty or punishment
for the trespass committed "235 Although the Protection from Abuse
227. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182(i) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
228. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182(ii) (Purdon Supp. 1981).
229. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182 (Purdon Supp. 1981).
230. See notes 121, 162 and accompanying text supra. See also Frieze, supra note 207, at
30-34. "[Tjhere appeared to be a number of types of reactions of the women to their marital
rape experiences. Most directly, the majority of the women felt anger or some other form of
husband-blaming affect about the rape experiences. . . .However, the women who reported
being raped often were the most self-blaming contrary to what we might have expected." Id at
30.
231. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 226, 372 A.2d 386, 390 (L. Div. 1977), afd per
curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38
(1981).
232. Rape and Battery, supra note 93, at 724.
233. The fear of the psychopathic rapist. . .[has] no doubt. . .[produced] the se-
vere sentences that the law stands ready to impose for rape. A number of states
provide for death as a possible or mandatory penalty for rape, although Furman v.
Georgia now prevents execution under some of these statutes. Other states provide
for sentences up to life imprisonment. Comparisons with crimes of comparable mag-
nitude show that rape carries very high penalties.
Comment, Rape and Rape Laws.- Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 926
(1973).
234. Id
235. State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 226, 372 A.2d 386, 390 (L. Div. 1977), aj7'd per
curiam, 169 N.J. Super. 98, 404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38
(1981) (emphasis added).
Act safeguards the personal safety of a spouse, only a marital rape
law can protect against the outrage a woman suffers when she is sex-
ually violated. The marital rape victim should not be forced to com-
promise when she seeks legal redress.
B. Abolition of Interspousal Tort Immunity
Until recently in Pennsylvania, a spouse was unable to sue or
recover on a tort claim from the other spouse while the parties were
married.236 Other jurisdictions, however, completely retain the in-
terspousal immunity.237  Several states abrogate the immunity only
in certain types of tort actions.238 The marital status of the parties at
the time of the actionable conduct, as well as at the time of suit,
governs the availability of an interspousal tort suit in other states.239
Apart from the preservation of family harmony, a major concern of
courts that refuse to broaden this ability to sue is whether a tort
claim suit can be truly adversary between husband and wife.2a°
The family harmony and fraudulent complaint arguments have
been refuted as rational justifications for the retention of the marital
exemption.24 ' They may also be disclaimed as adequate justifica-
tions for retaining spousal tort immunity. Indeed, a growing number
of American jurisdictions have abolished this defense in all inter-
spousal tort cases.242 It is inequitable, however, to allow a woman to
sue her husband only for damages when rape occurs within the mari-
tal relationship. Thus, the abolition of interspousal tort immunity is
an inadequate alternative.
Furthermore, in nonspousal rape situations the nonspousal rape
victim is guaranteed that criminal charges may be brought against
her assailant. The victim may also institute a civil action against the
236. See note 187 and accompanying text supra.
237. The following states are among the jurisdictions that retain the common law inter-
spousal immunity rule: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and Ohio.
238. See, e.g., Haymonon v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 375 Mass. 768, 378 N.E.2d 442
(1978); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267
A.2d 481 (1970); Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d I (R.I. 1978). These courts have abolished inter-
spousal immunity in automobile negligence actions. See also Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287
P.2d 572 (1955); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977), in which interspousal immu-
nity is abolished in intentional tort actions.
239. See, e.g., Gaston v. Pittman, 413 F.2d 1031 (5th Cir. 1969) (divorced woman can sue
former husband for tort committed prior to marriage); Windauer v. O'Connor, 107 Ariz. 267,
485 P.2d 1157 (1971) (spouse may sue after divorce); Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo.
1957) (spouse may sue after divorce for tort committed during marriage).
240. The following courts have reasoned that the immunity is necessary to an interspousal
suit: Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979); Williams v. Ray, 146 Ga. App. 333, 246
S.E.2d 387 (1978); Thomas v. Hemon, 20 Ohio St. 2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772 (1969); Rubalcava v.
Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963).
241. See Marital Rape, supra note 72, at 315-16.
242. See, e.g., Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979); Maestas v. Overton,
87 New Mexico, 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975); Foster v. Foster, 264 N.C. 694, 142 S.E.2d 638
(1965); Hack v. Hack, No. 81-516 (Pa. Supreme Court, filed July 14, 1981); Richard v. Rich-
ard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972).
rapist, 243 allowing her to recover damages for the humiliation and
pain incurred. The marital rape victim in Pennsylvania, however, is
afforded neither right.
The abolition of tort immunity, to permit a wife to sue her hus-
band for damages for injuries inflicted during a marital rape, is still
ineffective as a single remedy. If a married woman encounters diffi-
culties in proving lack of consent under a marital rape statute, she
will encounter the same problem of proof when she sues to recover
damages. In either instance, she cannot escape the burden of prov-
ing her nonconsent. Although the burden of proof may be lighter in
the civil action than in the criminal prosecution, that difference is not
sufficient justification to bar an alternative cause of action.
Moreover, the real harm24" imposed by an act of rape is not
protected by assault and battery actions.245 No physical manifesta-
tion of an injury results when a rape victim submits to threats of
immediate bodily harm. Thus, in such a situation, a wife is outside
the protection of assault and battery statutes. Assault and battery
laws are therefore inadequate because they fail to protect victims
from a "qualitatively different" 246 kind of harm.
C Divorce
.For some women, the logical consequence of rape within mar-
riage is divorce. If the wife cannot endure such behavior, the divorce
court may be a more appropriate forum for her complaint than a
criminal trial. The crucial point is that the option to divorce her
spouse or to prosecute under a marital rape statute should be avail-
able to the woman. The primary concern is that a woman has been
forcibly subjected to sexual intercourse against her will. When this
action occurs within a marriage, a woman may choose to terminate
the marital relationship. It is inconceivable, however, that divorce
should be the only possible remedial action to redress the harm suf-
fered by the wife-rape victim.
When a woman is assaulted, battered, defamed or defrauded by
her husband, she is not restricted to divorce as her sole remedy. It is
inapposite to maintain that divorce is the only solution when a wife
is raped: "It is small comfort to a married woman whose husband
has forcibly ravished her against her will to know that she may resort
243. See, e.g., Shaw v. Fletcher, 137 Fla. 519, 188 So. 135 (1939); Horby v. King, 13 N.J.
Super. 395, 80 A.2d 476 (1951).
244. See note 190 and accompanying text supra.
245. "Assault and battery suit alternatives are not sufficient to vindicate the rape action."
D. Baldwin, Director, Women in Crisis, Hummelstown, PA (telephone interview with author
on January 29, 1981). See notes 187-190 and accompanying text supra.
246. SeeMarital Rape, supra note 72, at 316. See also notes 121 and 122 and accompany-
ing text supra.
to the matrimonial courts to recapture or retrieve her right to sexual
privacy." '247 Clearly, divorce does not compensate or vindicate the
injuries of the victim. Furthermore, divorce lacks a deterrent effect
and is therefore an untenable solution.
VIII. Conclusion
Rape is essentially a crime of physical and moral effrontery.
Legal barriers, however, present a dilemma for women who are vic-
tims of marital rape. The law is currently in a state of turmoil. A
handful of states have entered a new area and recognized that the
common law rationales for spousal immunity are outmoded. The
traditional view that a husband cannot be prosecuted for the rape of
his wife remains in the law of Pennsylvania and in the law of the
majority of jurisdictions. Furthermore, previously unprotected
classes of defendants, including unmarried cohabitants and volun-
tary social companions are increasingly granted the protection of the
marital exemption.
Although the crime of rape has a uniquely individual impact,
the affront is not exclusively personal. All crimes offend society.
The seriousness of spousal rape is not diminished because it occurs
in the context of a marital or cohabital relationship. Thus, to allow
an otherwise criminal act to remain unpunished is a threat to the
moral principles that underlie society and the criminal law.
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